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Abstract
We study how cultural distance affects the rejection of imposed institutions. To this pur-
pose, we exploit the transplantation of Piedmontese institutions on Southern Italy which
occurred during the Italian unification. We assemble a novel and unique dataset contain-
ing information on episodes of brigandage, a form of violent uprising against the unitary
government, at the municipal level. We use geographic distance from local settlements
of Piedmontese descent as a proxy for cultural distance between each municipality and
the new rulers. We find robust evidence that cultural distance from the origins of the
transplanted institutions is significantly associated with more intense resistance to these
institutions. Our results further suggest that the rejection of the transplanted institutions
may have a long lasting effect on political participation.
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1 Introduction
The emergence of contemporary European states during the nineteenth century of-
ten coincided with the occurrence of nation building processes. In the case of Italy
and France, for instance, national rulers introduced uniform institutions across their
territories, implementing policies intended to create a unified legal environment and,
possibly, a unified national identity1. However, phenomena such as the rise of seces-
sionist movements and the lack of cultural convergence between regions of the same
country (Alesina et al., 2017) seem to suggest that the process of nation building
was not always successful.
In this paper, we investigate whether cultural differences play a relevant role in the
short-run rejection of new institutions. Such rejection may hinder state formation
processes in the short run. It can also have long-lasting effects on important aspects
of nation building, such as the intensity of political participation. We address this
question by analyzing the consequences of the imposition of Piedmontese institu-
tional features on the territories of continental Southern Italy2 during the Italian
unification. Three features of the Italian unification make it an ideal setting for our
analysis. First, the institutional rejection took on the very visible form of violent,
guerrilla-like popular unrest known as brigandage. Second, historical migrations
provide us with local variation in cultural distance from Piedmont across south-
ern municipalities. Finally, the incompleteness of Italy’s nation building process
is reflected by large and persistent differences in attitudes toward institutions, the
intensity of which may be partially evaluated in the light of that instance of insti-
tutional rejection.
The main contribution of our paper is threefold: first, we construct a novel dataset
of all recorded episodes of brigandage at the municipal level; second, we exploit our
data to quantify the intensity of institutional rejection across Southern Italy; and,
finally, we find strong evidence that rejection is closely linked to cultural distance
from Piedmont. We measure cultural distance by the geographical distance from
communities descending from near-Piedmontese settlers, whose persistent cultural
similarity with their ancestors is well documented by historians. A prolonged in-
teraction with Piedmontese descendants, occasional intermarriages and protracted
exposure to Piedmontese social norms will increase the cultural proximity of local
communities to sufficiently close near-Piedmontese settlements and, therefore, to
Piedmont itself. Knowing the number of brigandage episodes in each municipality,
we directly test whether cultural distance affects the likelihood that communities
reject transplanted institutions. Our results show that, on average, doubling the dis-
1See Alesina and Reich (2015) for historical examples of nation building in Europe.
2From now on, we shall simply refer to ‘Southern Italy’, but the limitation to the continental
regions applies everywhere.
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tance from the nearest Piedmontese enclave is associated with a 0.4-unit increase in
the number of uprisings per 1,000 inhabitants. This corresponds to a 20% increase
over the average number of uprisings (approximately 1.9 per 1,000 inhabitants).
Furthermore, we show that the effect of cultural proximity is non linear and de-
pends on the intensity of exposure to Piedmontese culture both in terms of number
of enclaves and percentage of population of Piedmontese descent.
Our results are robust to a wide range of alternative specifications and to the inclu-
sion of various controls. For example, we use alternative distance measures based
on the ancient Roman road network, as the intensity of social interactions depends
on accessible communications. Aside from measurement issues, one major threat
to identification is that our results may be driven by characteristics typical of all
ethno-linguistic enclaves (i.e., secludedness) and that there is really nothing specific
about our reference points being communities of near-Piedmontese descent. For
example, the latter may display higher social cohesion or have developed internal
social structures that reduce their propensity to violently reject transplanted insti-
tutions. To address this concern, we perform several placebo tests. In particular,
we replicate our analysis with different cultural enclaves (e.g. Greek, Croatian and
Albanian), for which we do not find any significant correlation with the number of
brigandage episodes. Our evidence thus supports the claim that cultural proximity
between the environment where the institutions originated and that where they are
applied plays a crucial role in determining these institutions’ ability to function.
After establishing the link between cultural proximity and institutional rejection,
we investigate whether there is a relation between our measure of the latter and
the medium-run levels of political participation and trust in national institutions,
both proxied by electoral turnout. Specifically, we demonstrate that the change in
electoral turnout between the 1861 and 1865 national elections is strongly nega-
tively correlated with the intensity of brigandage episodes occurring between 1862
and 18653. Institutional rejection thus induces lower political participation. We
also explore the relationship between episodes of brigandage and electoral turnout
in subsequent elections. We find suggestive evidence that municipalities with a
large number of uprisings had depressed turnout well into the early twentieth cen-
tury. This 40-year-long effect of brigandage suggests that the short-term rejection
of Piedmontese institutions impacted the nation building process through its long-
lasting influence on political participation.
Our results add new evidence to the literature on institutions and culture. The
positive impact of both well-functioning institutions and favorable cultural traits
on economic growth has been widely documented in the recent economic litera-
3This time span was chosen to capture the effect of uprisings occurring between the two electoral
rounds; see Section 5.
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ture4. However, these drivers of economic prosperity will, in general, evolve jointly
(Bisin and Verdier, 2017) and interact with one another (Tabellini, 2010; Alesina
and Giuliano, 2015; Lowes et al., 2017). The economic analysis of institutions and
institutional change often implicitly assumes cultural homogeneity (or downplays
the role of cultural differences) in the underlying environment (Acemoglu et al.,
2011), but empirical evidence suggests that the same institution can have different
effects when local norms and social capital are different (Putnam, 1993). In partic-
ular, how legal and administrative institutions work and their effectiveness in terms
of economic outcomes are deeply affected by the cultural traits of the environment
to which they are applied5.
The main empirical challenge in identifying the effect of cultural traits on insti-
tutional effectiveness is that institutional variation interplays with cultural varia-
tion6. Institutional transplantations – the deliberate, rapid and forced exportation
of institutions from one location (the donor environment) to another (the recipi-
ent environment) – can provide variation in institutions that is uncorrelated with
underlying cultural traits. Transplantations simultaneously involving several recip-
ients are particularly useful, as they often lead to the imposition of a uniform set of
institutions on culturally diverse groups. This allows one to overcome the potential
endogeneity issue related to the process by which institutions arise from a given
cultural environment, as the transplanted institutions are almost never designed to
be transplanted. Finally, as we shall see shortly, if one is interested not so much in
the role of specific traits as in that of the recipient’s culture relative to the donor’s,
the problem of measuring the cultural traits is reduced to that of defining and mea-
suring the cultural distance between donor and recipient.
Our findings complement and extend those of Berkowitz et al. (2003a), who argue
that what matters for the performance of transplanted institutions is their degree
of adaptation to local legal norms and pre-existing formal and informal institu-
tions, rather than the legal family to which they belong (see also Guinnane, 1994;
Berkowitz et al., 2003b; Pistor et al., 2003). While Berkowitz et al. (2003a) rely on
4See Acemoglu et al., 2005 and Guiso et al., 2006 for general introductions.
5See, among others, Guinnane (1994), Acemoglu and Jackson (2017), Guiso et al. (2016).
6Some examples of the difficulties arising when studying the interplay between cultural traits
and institutions are as follows: it is difficult for identical institutions to arise endogenously from
different cultural milieus (Tabellini and Greif, 2010); the same institution may display different
degrees of effectiveness when applied to different environments because of the institutional, rather
than the cultural, background of such environments (Ma, 2013); and culture itself may be in-
fluenced by institutional arrangements, implying an obvious endogeneity issue (Aldashev et al.,
2012). Moreover, cultural traits are difficult to specify and measure in absolute terms: ‘culture’
is composed of preferences and beliefs, and although several ingenious quantifications have been
proposed (e.g., Guiso et al., 2004), all inevitably capture only some aspects of a more general, yet
unfathomable, picture.
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cross-country variation over long horizons, we exploit a single episode and use finer
municipality-level variation. This reduces concerns of under-controlling for relevant
economic factors and allows us to isolate the importance of cultural proximity. In
the same spirit, Lecce and Ogliari (2017) show that the key to the long-run suc-
cess of institutional transplantations is not the set of underlying cultural traits but
the cultural proximity between donor and recipient. They test their hypothesis
by studying the imposition of French institutions on Prussian counties during the
Napoleonic occupation and the long-run effectiveness thereof, assessing the effect of
cultural proximity on what we may call the degree of institutional sedimentation.
However, in the short run, transplanted institutions face the possibility of immediate
rejection by the recipient: this may come in different forms, ranging from violent
uprising against the donor (as in our case) to the local bureaucracy preventing the
application of the foreign law or using the transplanted institutions to different ends
than those they were originally meant to achieve (as in Kurkchiyan, 2009). In this
paper, we measure the degree of institutional acceptance by recipient communities
and investigate whether cultural proximity to the donor, by decreasing the intensity
of rejection, facilitates the possibility that the transplanted institutions will take
hold in the first place7.
We also connect with other works in the economic literature that focus on Italian
post-unitary brigandage. Most notably, Accetturo et al. (2016) exploit a “side ef-
fect” of brigandage, i.e., the passage of the draconian Pica Law in 1863, to study the
effects of divisive policies on voter turnout in the aftermath of unification. Amodio
(2012) shows that three selected and notable brigandage episodes destroyed social
capital and had long-lasting effects on voter turnout. Finally, Bracco et al. (2015)
show that communities of Albanian ancestry, still residing in Southern Italy, retained
specific cultural traits and display peculiar levels of civic capital and attitudes to-
ward political participation. To the best of our knowledge, however, our paper is
the first to link near-Piedmontese (and, more generally, non-indigenous) ancestry in
Southern Italy with the intensity of brigandage.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the historical
background, discussing the political situation of the Italian peninsula before the
military invasion and in the aftermath of unification, the guerrilla episodes following
the creation of the new state, and the history of the northern cultural enclaves settled
in Southern Italy. Section 3 illustrates our data and provides some descriptive
statistics. Section 4 presents our identification strategy, illustrates the main results
and discusses their robustness. Section 5 investigates the relationships between
brigandage and social capital in the long run. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
7In a different context, Fisman et al. (2017) stress the importance of cultural proximity in
mitigating informational asymmetries in the Indian lending market.
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2 Historical context
2.1 Italian unification and brigandage
Our analysis is made possible by the peculiar historical circumstances that arose
within the Italian unification process of the 1860s. Between the spring and sum-
mer of 1860, after landing in Sicily, general Garibaldi had occupied the territory
of the former Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, which included Sicily and continental
Southern Italy (henceforth just ‘Southern Italy’) and had hitherto been ruled by the
Bourbon dynasty8. The degree to which the Piedmontese king (Victor Emmanuel
of Savoy) and prime minister (Camillo Cavour) supported Garibaldi’s initiative re-
mains an object of debate among historians. Nevertheless, by the late summer of
1860, Garibaldi was ruling as pro tempore dictator in the name of the Savoy, after
having ousted the legitimate king from Naples, the capital city, and forced him and
the remnants of the Bourbon army to retreat within the walls of the city-fortress of
Gaeta, near the border with the Papal States9. Unable to further delay an official
military intervention, the Piedmontese army descended into Southern Italy, and by
October 1860, the former Bourbon territories had been integrated into the Pied-
montese kingdom.
The unification process was carried out by a complete transfer of the Piedmontese
institutions onto the annexed territories. The Statuto Albertino (the Piedmontese
constitution) became the constitution of the newly formed state and, between late
1860 and early 1861, the Piedmontese lieutenants began issuing decrees involving the
extension of the whole Piedmontese administrative and judicial system to the rest
of Italy and assigned key administrative position to loyal Piedmonese officials. The
intention of the Piedmontese to extend their law and administration to the invaded
areas was commonly known even before the territorial occupation was completed.
Ultimately, the explicit intention of the Savoy king was to unify all Italian-speaking
territories under his rule10. There was no indication that Victor Emmanuel and
Cavour would adopt any form of federalism: following the post-Napoleonic French
tradition, Savoy rule was not authoritarian but heavily centralized and aimed at cre-
ating a “strong state”, disregarding local diversities that could hinder the political
unity of the new kingdom.
The transplantation of the Piedmontese institution created a sense of dissatisfac-
8For an administrative map of Southern Italy in the period under study, see Figure 1. Most of
what follows is based on historical research by Molfese (1964).
9Other southern troops gathered in the strongholds at Messina (Sicily) and Civitella del Tronto
(at the north-eastern extremity of the kingdom).
10The continuity with the earlier Kingdom of Sardinia was also emphasized by two measures of
extreme symbolic value: the regnal number of the king – Vittorio Emanuele remained “the second”
instead of becoming the “first” king of Italy – and the extension of the Piedmontese currency to
the whole kingdom.
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tion among part of the élites and most of the common population alike, by whom
the Piedmontization of the institutions was considered a form of hostile invasion
and not of annexation11. The sentiment of dissatisfaction provided fertile ground
for the Bourbon house to instigate unrest. The first months of Piedmontese rule,
when Bourbon resistance was still thriving within the military strongholds, were
characterized by unorganized popular uprisings in rural towns, most of which were
sparked by instigators affiliated with either the former king or the Church. This
first phase of reaction against the Piedmontese invasion faded as rapidly as the au-
thorities that supported it: Gaeta surrendered in February 1861 and the Church,
already deprived of more than half of its former territories, decreased the intensity
of hostilities around that time. Nevertheless, it soon became clear that insurgencies,
albeit instigated by loyalist agents, were founded upon deeper roots.
Three aspects of the institutional transplantation deeply resonated with the masses
and served as a catalyst for their mobilization. First, in line with its nineteenth-
century liberal ideology, the Piedmontese government was unambiguously anti-cle-
rical, and its civil and penal law contained hardline provisions against the Church’s
temporal power and economic stance. Religious orders were either abolished or
deprived of land and other possessions. This constituted a shock to the rural com-
munities of Southern Italy, not only on cultural or ideological grounds, but also
because ecclesiastical organizations would often intervene in favor of the poorest
and weakest during times of economic downturn. A similar mechanism underlies
the reasons behind the negative reception of Piedmontese land reforms by the lower
classes. Southern Italy was organized as a post-feudal economy, with a tiny class
of landlords owning large estates (the so-called latifondi), an equally small but in-
creasingly wealthy and powerful urban middle class, and a large mass of landless
and mostly propertyless peasants12. The possessive capacity of those few landlords
was limited by the presence of state-owned lands (terre demaniali). These plots13
were directly owned by the Crown and could be used as pasture or farming land by
peasants, guaranteeing subsistence in times of poor harvest and/or low employment
11In a heartfelt parliamentary motion presented on November 20, 1860, duke Marzio Francesco
Proto Carafa Pallavicino, deputy of Casoria, complained about the extensive presence of the Pied-
montese in key official positions and clearly stated the sentiment of dissatisfaction felt by the
Neapolitan population: “There is not an instance in which an honest man could earn something
without involving a Piedmontese to help. [...] This is invasion, not union, not annexation! This
is treating our land as a conquest land. [...] The government of Piedmont wants to treat our land
as Cortez and Pizarro did in Peru and Mexico.”
12In the first decades of the nineteenth century, Cerignola, in northern Apulia, was a wealthier-
than-average agricultural town, the development of which is certified by sizable immigration. How-
ever, only 40.5% of its inhabitants lived on a larger-than-subsistence income, and 68% of households
were headed by landless peasants (Russo, 1988).
13To appreciate their extension, consider that, a few decades before national unification, state-
owned land constituted 54.4% of the agricultural land in the flat countryside of Cerignola (Russo,
1988) and 39% of the mountainous municipality of Morcone (De Francesco, 1988).
7
(Liberati, 1988). Retrieving an old plan drafted by the Napoleonic government at
the beginning of the century (and that had already sparked an insurgency at the
time, see Pappalardo, 2014), the new government decided to partition and auction
off these lands. The reorganization of land usage benefited the urban bourgeoisie
(which supported national unification) and some pro-Piedmont landowners but was
perceived as a tragedy by the peasants, reinforcing their connection with the former
king and the Church, who were thought of as friendly authorities, as opposed to
the local nobility and the foreign invaders. Finally, the Savoy decrees contained
provisions for the inclusion in the newly formed national army of both ex-Bourbon
and new recruits: to this end, compulsory military service was planned for 1861 and
the subsequent years14.
Thus by 1861 all the unwelcome innovations coupled with the demise of the refer-
ence authorities of the past centuries (the Bourbon king and the Church) sparked
a new wave of popular unrest that, in some communities, led to the organization
of guerrilla groups of so-called brigands. Brigands came almost invariably from the
peasant class, being joined in some cases by disbanded Bourbon soldiers who refused
to integrate into the new army’s ranks. Their bands varied in size, ranging from few
individuals to hundreds: one of the best-known brigand leaders, Carmine Crocco,
claimed to have once led an army of more than 2,000 (Ciocca, 2013). Bands existed
almost exclusively in rural areas and, due to their need to escape regular troops,
concentrated where control over the territory by the non-indigenous was more diffi-
cult, i.e., around the mountain range of the Apennines and the hillside areas to the
north and east of Naples (Figure 4).
Scholars partition the brief history of brigandage into three phases. The first coin-
cides with the formation of brigand bands throughout the year 1861. The influence
of the Church and the king and the hope that the latter would return – and old
institutions would thus be restored – remained the main drivers of brigand activity
in this period. This amounted to instigating and leading episodic revolts in rural
municipalities; attacking non-loyalist landowners, especially the urban élite who had
acquired lands thanks to the Piedmontese reforms; and, occasionally, clashing with
regular troops. Between incursions, brigands would retreat to secluded areas that
they left only to obtain supplies, an activity that was constantly supported by the
local peasantry. The second phase (known as ‘grande brigantaggio’) saw brigand
groups organizing in paramilitary fashion, with commanders-in-chief and a more
stable structure and focusing their attention on recapturing villages and towns from
the newly formed Italian army’s control. Despite the Piedmontese governors sending
14The unraveling of Piedmontese plans for the re-organization of the Southern army epitomizes
the popular opposition to the regime change: a decree was issued on December 20, 1860, to
reintegrate 70,000 Bourbon soldiers into serving under Piedmontese command. The deadline was
delayed several times, but by June 1861, only 20,000 had appeared for service.
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increasingly larger contingents to the inland provinces of Southern Italy15, intense
guerrilla warfare lasted until 1864. Unable to cope with such political instability in
half of the national territory and facing a seemingly endless drainage of resources,
the government introduced a form of martial law (the so-called Pica law) in August
1863. The Pica Law was introduced with the goal of providing “temporary and
exceptional means of defense” for public order. This law identified a number of
provinces “infested by brigandage” and it enforced new public order rules to repress
and prevent criminal activity. In particular, it allowed the military courts to rule on
brigandage-related felonies and empowered the local police with a wider set of tools
to control public order. The hardening of legal provisions and the near-absolute
power given to the military over 11 out of 16 provinces in Southern Italy (going
as far as allowing the execution of suspects without a trial) were effective, and the
intensity of brigand activity began fading in the second half of 1863. By 1865, the
political brigandage had somewhat degenerated into common criminality partially
losing the connotation of anti-Piedmontese resistance.
Post-unitary brigandage was an explicit, violent form of reaction against the in-
stitutions transplanted by the Piedmontese and, in particular, of those provisions
of the law that directly interfered with the life of common peasants16. It was a
large-scale phenomenon in Southern Italy, a true civil war. According to official
data reported by Molfese (1964), between 1861 and 1865, out of a total number of
brigands estimated at approximately 80,000, more than 5,000 had been killed (dur-
ing military operations or by execution), a similar number had been arrested and
approximately 3,600 had surrendered. According to Ciocca (2013), approximately
6,500 brigands and more than 1,600 regular soldiers were killed in the more extended
period 1861-1869. In this paper, we use the number of brigandage-related events in
each municipality of Southern Italy as a measure of the intensity of the rejection
of the institutional transplantation occurring during the Piedmontese invasion of
Southern Italy and the consequent process of national unification.
15Apparently, at the height of the anti-brigandage operations in early 1864, the Italian army was
deploying more than 110,000 soldiers against the brigands, amounting to approximately two-thirds
of the available units (Ciocca, 2013).
16The anti-institutional sentiment and the objective to safeguard the poor masses are clear from
a brigand song from Mercato Cilento “Tu si’ lu giurici re li miei signuri, i’ so’ lo capo re li
fuorilegge; tu scrivi co’ la penna e dai ruluri, i’ vao ppe’ lu munno senza legge. Tu tieni carta,
penna e calamaio ppe’ castia’ a sti poveri pezzienti, i’ tengo povole e chiummo, quanno sparo:
giustizia fazzo a chi non tene nienti. (Translation: You are the judge of the lords, I am the head
of the outlaws; you write by pen and cause sorrow, I go around the world without law. You have
paper, pen and inkpot to punish these poor souls, I have got gunpowder and bullets, when I shoot:
justice I make for those who have nothing.)”
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2.2 Near-Piedmontese enclaves in Southern Italy
The aim of this paper is to test the hypothesis that cultural traits matter for in-
stitutional acceptance. We focus on a specific aspect of the cultural identity of
the receiving environment, namely its cultural proximity to the donor. Our task
is therefore to test whether cultural proximity has a (positive) impact on institu-
tional acceptance. To this purpose, we rely on the existence of communities of
near-Piedmontese descent in areas where brigandage was, on average, intense.
2.2.1 Origins
There is substantial agreement among historians that such communities were estab-
lished in the late Middle Ages (with the earliest mentions dating back to between
the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries). We call them ‘near-Piedmontese’ because
not all of the places of origin of the immigrants who first settled these communities
lie within the current borders of Piedmont (some trace their origin back to the con-
temporary region of Liguria; see Toso, 2002) or within the 1861 borders of the King-
dom of Savoy (other communities are thought to be descendants of soldiers coming
from the Alpine valleys of what is now south-eastern France; see De Salvio, 1908).
What matters for this paper is that all of them originated within the Provence-
Savoy-Piedmont area, which is also the cradle of the Kingdom of Savoy and the
macro-region where its cultural traits developed. Ten near-Piedmontese communi-
ties are easily identifiable (and were at the time of the Italian unification) because
they retain Gallo-Romance dialects17. For most of such municipalities, the Gallo-
Romance dialect was the only language spoken by peasants at the time of the events
we are studying, although it is believed that most could communicate, at least at a
basic level, in the language of the surrounding provinces, and many would have un-
derstood Standard Italian because of partial mutual intelligibility (De Mauro, 1963).
Linguistics helps us in identifying the places of origin and, consequently, in clarifying
the reason underlying the migratory phenomena that led to the formation of these
communities. The ten near-Piedmontese enclaves constitute four geographically dis-
tinct clusters: the municipalities of Celle di San Vito and Faeto in northern Apulia;
seven municipalities in Basilicata, divided into two clusters (Picerno, Pignola, Tito
and Vaglio on the one hand and Nemoli, Rivello and Trecchina on the other); and
the isolated municipality of Guardia Piemontese in northern Calabria. Despite the
scarcity of documents, contemporary historians tend to exclude the possibility that
the main motive for these communities settling in Southern Italy may have been an
attempt to escape religious persecution. The origin of the Apulian Franco-Provençal
settlement has been traced back to soldier relocation and land assignment by Charles
of Anjou in the 1260-1270s (see, for instance, De Salvio, 1908 and Melillo, 1959).
17We use an extensive definition of ‘Gallo-Romance languages’ that encompasses Franco-
Provençal, Occitan and the Gallo-Italic languages of Piedmont and Liguria.
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Based on linguistic evidence, Pfister (1991) and Toso (2002) suggest that most of
the Gallo-Italic speakers from Basilicata descend from southern Piedmontese and/or
Ligurian colonizers, who are not believed to have been interested in religious strug-
gles. The Calabrian settlement of Guardia was, indeed, created by a Waldensian
community, and it is possible that southward migration was sparked by fears of
persecution following the Albigensian Crusade (early thirteenth century). There is
no evidence, however, that the religious motives affected the choice of the precise
location of the colony (which might have been otherwise explicitly selected for its
secludedness or defensibility). In fact, the Waldensians were positively received by
the Calabrian nobility and faced no difficulties until after the Reformation, when
because of their adherence to Protestantism, they suffered harsh persecutions (Veg-
ezzi Ruscalla, 1862).
2.2.2 Cultural persistence
It is crucial for our empirical strategy that these ethno-linguistic enclaves retained
the cultural traits of their ancestors over the centuries. Historical evidence docu-
ments a persistent cultural similarity between the inhabitants of these near-Piedmontese
enclaves and their ancestors. This is made particularly evident by the survival of
ancestral linguistic traits, which is usually associated with the persistence of other,
less evident cultural traits18. German linguist Gerhard Rohlfs was the first to study
the peculiar linguistic traits of near-Piedmontese municipalities in Basilicata. He
reported how local dialects displayed several analogies with Gallo-Romance lan-
guages (including the Sicilian Gallo-Romance dialect) and structurally differed from
the dialect spoken in the surrounding region19. Linguistic similarities are reported
also for the other three enclaves. Vegezzi Ruscalla (1862) provides an ethnographic
study of Guardia Piemontese in which he thoroughly reports the analogies between
the local language and that spoken in the Piedmontese valleys where the ances-
tors of Guardia’s inhabitants originated and underlines the persistent resemblances
with Piedmontese20. Finally, De Salvio (1908) led a comparative study of the di-
alect spoken in Celle and Faeto at the beginning of the twentieth century and the
18A growing empirical literature studies the relationships among ancestry, language diffusion
and cultural persistence over time and space; see Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2016a for further details.
19Rohlfs identifies the core of a northernmost near-Piedmontese cluster in the municipalities of
Potenza, Tito, Picerno, Pignola and Vaglio. Moreover, he reports Trecchina (the municipality with
the strongest resemblance to northern languages), Rivello, Nemoli and San Costantino (currently
part of the municipality of Rivello) to be part of a southern Gallo-Romance cluster: figure A2
in appendix A depicts a map of the two near-Piedmontese clusters in Basilicata. Figure A1 in
appendix A is a comparative table of the languages spoken in the near-Piedmontese community
of Tito in San Chirico (a nearby non near-Piedmontese community) and in two municipalities in
Liguria and Piedmont (the areas of origin of near-Piedmontese colonizers). See Rohlfs (1988) for
further details.
20Figure A3 in appendix A offers some examples of linguistic similarities and differences com-
paring the Italian language, the dialect spoken in Guardia Piemontese, the dialect spoken in Val
d’Angrogna and the dialect spoken in Cosenza (the largest city near Guardia Piemontese).
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old Savoy dialect of the Middle Ages: the results of this comparison proved that
these languages were closely connected. In addition to their linguistic traits, near-
Piedmontese communities have retained other aspects of their ancestral culture:
writing around the time of our events of interest, Vegezzi Ruscalla (1862) reports
that the inhabitants of Guardia Piemontese maintained very similar customs to their
Piedmontese ancestors in terms of clothing and, more important for our analysis,
attitudes toward property and work21. We thus exploit these linguistic and cultural
enclaves to proxy for the cultural distance of Southern Italy communities from the
donor environment, assuming that near-Piedmontese enclaves embody customs and
social norms very similar to those prevailing in Piedmont.
2.2.3 Interactions with neighboring communities
Geographical isolation favored cultural persistence in near-Piedmontese enclaves but
did not inhibit social interactions with neighboring populations. It is important for
our empirical strategy that the descendants of Piedmontese settlers had intense
contacts with local populations. There is an extensive literature documenting how
culture and social norms spread by frequent contact and social interaction: in the
language of Cavalli Sforza and Feldman (1981), both vertical and horizontal trans-
mission mechanisms are assumed to co-exist22. For instance, Fogli and Veldkamp
(2011) document the relationship between the increase in female labor force partici-
pation in the United States and the spacial diffusion of beliefs about women’s roles.
Spolaore and Wacziarg (2016b) claim that the historical fertility decline in Europe,
which began in France, depended on the diffusion of new social norms and behav-
ioral changes via social interaction and social influence. We conjecture that frequent
interactions between near-Piedmontese enclaves and nearby communities generated
a significant convergence in cultural and social norms and that the strength of those
interactions strictly depended on geographic distances, considering in particular the
lack of advanced communication systems in historical Southern Italy.
A first channel of social interaction was trade between the near-Piedmontese com-
munities and the neighboring municipalities. Historical sources attest that some
of the near-Piedmontese communities were not self-sufficient, necessitating frequent
commercial exchanges in local markets and fairs. Bitonti (2012) documents how
both Celle di San Vito and Faeto had frequent contacts with neighboring munici-
palities in the fifteenth century, in particular establishing a commercial partnership
with the town of Ariano Irpino. A second channel of interaction was intermar-
riage. Vegezzi Ruscalla (1862) reports that, after the Reformation and the following
persecution, Guardia’s citizens were at times forced to marry outside their own
21Rohlfs (1972) also reports strong similarities in clothing between inhabitants of Guardia
Piemontese in the first half of nineteenth century and their Piedmontese ancestors.
22For a review of the economic analysis of cultural transmission mechanisms, see Bisin and
Verdier (2011).
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community. While there is no easily available record of local marriages, we may
gain some insight by exploring the local diffusion of Gallo-Italic surnames. Rohlfs
(1985) identifies 22 surnames that are likely to derive from historical Piedmontese
migrations23. The author also reports the municipalities in which these surnames
are relatively frequent. When we locate municipalities where these surnames are
recorded, we observe that the average distance from the closest near-Piedmontese
enclave is approximately 30 km, with a peak of 90 km. This evidence supports
our conjecture that Piedmontese descendants had the opportunity to interact with
nearby communities.
To further explore whether Piedmontese descendants had social relations with their
neighbors, we again rely on linguistic similarities. In our specific environment, given
the geographic isolation of our communities of interest, linguistic admixture is a
distinct sign that some form of social interaction must have taken place. Men-
nonna (1987) states that the dialects of the near-Piedmontese enclaves of Basilicata
had influences on the (non-Gallo-Romance) dialects of neighboring towns because
of economic and cultural exchanges among bordering municipalities. Rohlfs (1988)
reports Gallo-Romance influences in the – otherwise southern – dialects of the towns
of Avigliano, Cancellara, Ruoti and Trivigno, close to the northernmost cluster of
near-Piedmontese enclaves in Basilicata. Minor Gallo-Romance elements may also
be found in the dialect spoken in Maratea, near the southernmost cluster (Figure
A2).
3 Data and variables
As anticipated in Section 2, the main dependent variable in our analysis is the in-
tensity of brigandage, which we measure as the incidence of brigandage (i.e., the
number of brigandage-related episodes in each municipality divided by the munic-
ipality’s population, measured in thousands of units). We use these measures of
brigand activity to quantify the intensity of the rejection of the institutional trans-
plantation in each of the 1,855 post-unitary municipalities of Southern Italy (see
Figure 2). We digitized the information collected in three volumes,24 which include
all the reported episodes of brigandage by the Italian Ministry of Culture from the
State Archives of Southern Italy provinces (for an example of some entries in the
State Archives, see Figure 3). This led to a total of 12,242 brigandage episodes for
which we know the geographical location, the type of offense, the authority that re-
ported it and the year that the offense was recorded. On average, the municipalities
in our population experienced approximately 6.6 episodes each (corresponding to
approximately 1.93 episodes per thousand inhabitants), with approximately 68.5%
23Figure A4 in appendix A provides the original list of surnames by Rohlfs (1985).
24Ministero per i Beni e le Attività Culturali (1999-2001).
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of them experiencing at least one episode and the most intensely brigand-stricken
municipality reaching 64 episodes per thousand inhabitants. The total number of
episodes exceeds that indicated by most historians who focus on major brigandage
events25. Based on information contained in the original records, we are able to
classify episodes into four broad categories of offense: violent crimes, clashes with
authorities and armed insurrections (36.3%); non-violent crimes such as theft, arson
and instances of connivance (36.8%); and, finally, a residual category including all
episodes reported as notifications of the presence of brigand bands, reports by cit-
izens or arrests (26.8%). Furthermore, just under half of our episodes (45%) were
recorded by courts at any level; most of the other half were recorded by public
safety institutions such as the police or the Prefetture, the local representatives of
the Ministry of the Interior (46%)26. Approximately one in four (24.1%) occurrences
belong to the early phase of brigandage (1860-1861), characterized by the immediate
reaction to Piedmontese occupation; approximately three-quarters of our episodes
(74.3%) are associated with the most intense phase of brigand guerrilla war (1860-
1864); and the remaining 25.7% were recorded between 1865 and 187027.
The main explanatory variable, which we use to proxy for cultural distance from
Piedmont, the donor of the institutional transplant, in the short-term analysis is
the (geographic) distance of each municipality from the nearest near-Piedmontese
community, which we measure in two different ways. In the baseline specifications,
we use linear distances between municipal seats. One might argue that, as culture
typically spreads through frequent contacts such as marriage and trade, a measure
of actual traveling distance between two places may be more appropriate than linear
distance for the matter at hand. For this reason, in a subsequent robustness check,
we compute distances using the ancient Roman road network as reconstructed by
McCormick et al. (2013). In most of our specifications, we use log-transformed ver-
sions of these distances28: over the whole population, the two transformed measures
display a highly positive, but not perfect, degree of correlation.
Finally, in addition to geographic characteristics, we control for socio-demographic
25Using a different data source, i.e., the clashes reported by Molfese (1964), which should be a
right-tail selection of our observations in terms of the degree of violence, one can isolate 475 major
episodes, concentrated in approximately 19% of the municipalities.
26Since the records are from different sources, there could be overreporting of some episodes.
We address this issue in Section 4.3.4 by considering only episodes reported by the police.
27When considering the temporal distribution of brigandage, however, one must bear in mind
that different institutions might have recorded episodes with varying delay: for instance, courts may
have recorded some episodes at the beginning of the associated trials, which may have occurred
months or even years after the suspected crime had taken place. In particular, some episodes
located in the last phase might in fact refer to brigandage activities taking place before 1865.
28This choice is in line with our interpretation of physical distance as an inverse proxy for cultural
proximity: the diffusion of culture from a point of origin suggests that equal increases in physical
distance should be deemed less important the farther they are from the origin.
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and economic features of Southern Italy municipalities and provinces before unifi-
cation. To this purpose, we collect and digitize novel data from several statistical
sources dating back to the last decades of the Kingdom of Two Sicilies29, and popu-
lation data concerning the years immediately following Italian unification, obtained
from the Italian Census of 1861 and the additional statistical reports of the following
decade. To capture differentials in economic growth across municipalities prior to
the onset of the events we study, we compute the population growth rate between
1824 and 1861 (both values are reported in the Italian 1861 Census). Other vari-
ables that were recorded before national unification (most of which between 1830
and 1850) at the municipal level include indicators for the presence in each munici-
pality of civil, criminal or commercial courts; of the local episcopal or archiepiscopal
seat; of secondary education institutes30; of hospitals; and of relevant manufac-
tures or proto-industrial plants. We also digitize information reported by Corona
(1995) to construct an indicator of popular attitudes toward innovation and the
privatization/distribution of common-use lands31. We further collect information
on provincial level pre-unitary characteristics: the number of individuals subject to
military draft in 1834; the total number of landowners, farmers and fishermen; and
the total number of professionals, artists and servants. We also digitize provincial
data on tax revenues, municipal revenues and total expenditure for public works in
1850-51. Moreover, using data collected by (Villani, 1964), we are able to obtain
some provincial measures of the intensity and patterns of the diffusion of monaster-
ies and the sale of their lands during the Napoleonic period.
As it emerges visually from Figure 4, the majority of brigand activities were con-
centrated along the Apennine range and, in general, in inland municipalities rather
than in coastal towns. Table 1 reports the average of our main geographic and socio-
economic controls for municipalities with a brigandage incidence below the median
(column 1); for the complementary set of municipalities with incidences above the
median (column 2); and, finally, for the municipalities most affected by brigandage
(those with incidences in the top quartile, column 3). The patterns are as expected:
29Our main data sources are the Annali Civili, an official statistical publication by the Ministry
of the Interior of the Kingdom of Two Sicilies, published in several volumes between 1833 and
1860; the statistical collection (Statistica dell’Italia) by Count L. Serristori published in 1842;
and historical works on the distribution of lands belonging to monasteries during the Napoleonic
period (Villani, 1964) and on the reaction to provisions of land redistribution during the nineteenth
century (Corona, 1995).
30These are divided into licei, collegi and other secondary schools.
31The information provided by Corona (1995) refers to the last decades of the eighteenth century
and therefore predate the period under analysis by 70-80 years. Such information consists of reports
of behaviors by local communities in response to innovations in land property under the Bourbon
regime. This allows us to construct a (censored) index of attitudes toward such innovations.
Specifically, we assign a score of −1 to communities that enacted behaviors explicitly opposed
to innovations and a score of +1 for municipalities with episodes of cooperation with innovative
legislation.
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communities with higher levels of brigandage tend to be larger in area but smaller
in population, which is consistent with their location at the center of the peninsula,
in mountainous areas, relatively far from the coast and major towns. The distance
from Naples, the kingdom’s capital city, appears to be negatively correlated with
brigandage intensity: this is due to both areas near Naples being attractive to brig-
ands because of their wealth (the province of Naples exhibited, for instance, a larger
population growth rate than the rest of Southern Italy over the period 1824-1861)
and because brigandage was almost absent from the southernmost extremities of
Southern Italy, i.e., the tips of Apulia and Calabria, which are the areas located
farthest from Naples. The same geographic disposition explains part of the evidence
concerning the distance from the Papal States (lying beyond the northernmost bor-
der of the kingdom), to which the explicit support given to brigands by the Church
in the earliest phases may also have contributed.
Table 2 reports the mean values of several geographic controls and our dependent
variable for near-Piedmontese communities (column 1) and all other municipalities
in Southern Italy (column 2). Differences in such values (column 3) are statistically
significant only in the case of altitude, raggedness (quantified by the difference in
altitude between the highest and the lowest point in the municipality’s territory), soil
quality32 and, to a lesser degree, distance from Naples. One should bear in mind that
the differences in the first three dimensions are all due to the mountainous location of
near-Piedmontese communities: municipalities along the Apennine range typically
include mountain tops and valleys in their territory (which explains raggedness)
and areas with potentially high crop yield. This evidence helps us in overcoming
the concern that – once altitude is taken into account – the location and physical
characteristics of near-Piedmontese communities were non-randomly chosen by near-
Piedmontese colonizers and that the drivers of such choices might also be the drivers
of our findings on the relationship between distance from these locations and the
intensity of brigandage.
4 Cultural distance and brigandage: an institu-
tional rejection
In this section, we show that, after controlling for a number of geographic and
socio-economic observables, the intensity of brigandage is positively correlated with
the distance to the near-Piedmontese communities. Our main contribution to the
aforementioned literature on the interaction between culture and institutions and,
specifically, to existing work on institutional transplantation is the conclusion that
32Our main soil quality measure is the caloric suitability index constructed by Galor and Özak
(2016), to which we refer for further details. Elsewhere, we also employ data from the European
Soil Database (v. 2.0) compiled by the European Soil Data Center (ESDAC).
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follows from such evidence: cultural traits matter in affecting the degree to which
institutions are accepted and, therefore, allowed to potentially function; moreover,
although we remain agnostic on which traits have the largest impact, we show that
cultural proximity to the origin of the institutional arrangement is crucial in making
these institutions more palatable and, consequently, more likely to work well.
4.1 Empirical framework
The empirical analysis has two different layers, a short-term and a longer-term layer.
The former is investigated by exploiting two different historical features that are cru-
cial for our specification. The first mechanism underpinning our empirical analysis
is the persistence of cultural traits in near-Piedmontese enclaves, which guarantees
variation in the degree of cultural proximity of Southern Italy municipalities (the
receiving environment) to the new Piedmontese rulers (representing the donor en-
vironment). Evidence of this phenomenon is discussed in Section 2.2.2. The second
important feature is the diffusion of these cultural traits among neighboring commu-
nities. Historical social interactions based on marriages and trade were documented
in Section 2.2.3, relying on linguistic affinities and the geographical diffusion of sur-
names. The intensity of interaction with Near-Piedmontese communities is thought
to have been inversely correlated with geographical distance, given the lack of de-
veloped communications in historical Southern Italy. Hence, we deem geographical
distance to be a reliable proxy for cultural similarity with near-Piedmontese com-
munities and, indirectly, with the Piedmontese donor environment. Higher cultural
proximity to the new government determines a more favorable environment for the
adoption of new institutions and a lower incidence of popular unrest in the short
term. The second layer addresses the relationship between institutional rejection in
the aftermath of Italian unification and social and political outcomes in a longer-term
perspective. It establishes that territories with a higher incidence of brigandage are
characterized by lower levels of electoral turnout until the beginning of the twentieth
century. Figure 5 provides an overview of the mechanisms underlying our empirical
analysis.
4.2 Identification strategy
To test our central hypothesis, namely that, ceteris paribus, Piedmontese institutions
were more harshly rejected in regions farther from near-Piedmontese communities
and, therefore, less exposed to the influence of an near-Piedmontese culture, we
estimate several generalized linear models of the form
g (E(Yi,j | Xi,j)) = β1Disti + β2Popi + β′3Gi + β′4Ci + β′5Provj (1)
where Yi,j is the number of brigandage episodes recorded in town i of province j
or, in some specifications, the incidence of brigandage in town i of province j; Xi,j
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denotes all regressors related to town i of province j, which include Disti, a mea-
sure of the distance of municipality i from the closest near-Piedmontese community,
our main independent variable; Popi (a suitable transformation of the) population of
town i33; Gi and Ci, vectors of geographical and pre-unitary socio-economic controls,
respectively, measured at the municipality level; and Provj, a set of pre-unitary con-
trols measured at the province level, possibly reduced to a set of province indicators.
The key coefficient is β1, the effect of the distance from the closest near-Piedmontese
community on the number of brigandage episodes or the incidence of brigandage.
We expect β1 to be positive and significantly different from zero, indicating that,
conditional on our control, closeness to some near-Piedmontese community reduces
a municipality’s propensity to experience brigand activity in its territory.
Our identification relies on the absence of correlation between our measure of dis-
tance and the error terms, conditional on all controls. Taking settlement locations as
fixed, this amounts to claiming that the location of near-Piedmontese communities
must be randomly determined. Among other factors, we control for time-invariant
observables, such as altitude and linear distances from the coastline and the capital
city, which, as presented in the previous subsection, make the assignment to be-
ing a near-Piedmontese community approximately random. Moreover, while near-
Piedmontese communities are the result of migratory movements, historical evidence
presented in Section 2 suggests that the first colonizers did not autonomously decide
where to settle, having been either invited (by landowners) or ordered (by political
and military authorities) to take possession of those areas. Thus, the location and
characteristics of near-Piedmontese communities were not chosen according to cri-
teria that might, through other channels, influenced the presence and/or intensity
of brigand activity.
Our interpretation of the results relies on the dual assumption that culture exhibits
long-run persistence and, simultaneously, that the near-Piedmontese communities
we focus on – despite being isolated enough for their ancestral culture to be preserved
within a rather homogeneous and culturally distant surrounding environment – have
interacted with their neighbors, as we discussed in Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Baseline specification
Table 3 reports estimates of OLS models (columns 1–3) and negative binomial mod-
els (columns 4–6) relating the total number of brigandage episodes to the linear
33When g is not linear and the specification requires the dependent variable to take on integer
values, the impact of regressors on the incidence of brigandage, which in linear models is measured
as the number of episodes per 1,000 inhabitants, is found by retaining the number of episodes as
the dependent variable and forcing β2 = 1, using log-transformed population as Popi.
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distance of each municipality from the nearest near-Piedmontese community and a
varying set of controls34. The relevant distances are log-transformed35. All specifica-
tions include province fixed effects. Columns (7)-(9) report estimates of OLS models
using the incidence of brigandage (i.e. the total number of episodes is normalized
by Population in 1861) as dependent variable. Columns (10)-(12) report the result
for a negative binomial model where the restriction β2 = 1 applies (see footnote
33). Columns (1) and (4) include the most basic demographic controls: population
growth in the period 1824-1861 (which may also serve as an indicator of economic
growth in this pre-industrial setting), the log-transformed municipal population as
reported in the 1861 Census and the main geographical controls (coordinates, area,
altitude and raggedness). Columns (2) and (5) add our distance controls, while
columns (3) and (6) complete the specifications by adding pre-unification municipal-
level variables. Columns (7)-(9) do not include the log-transformed municipal pop-
ulation when using the linear model, to match the aforementioned restriction on the
coefficient for population in count models (10)-(12). The most complete specifica-
tions (namely, models (3), (6), (9) and (12)) all display a positive and significant
correlation between the intensity of brigandage and the distance from the nearest
near-Piedmontese community. Clearly, we do not claim such distance to be the main
driver of brigandage intensity, but its effect is sizable: according to the estimates
in (9), doubling the distance from the nearest near-Piedmontese community is as-
sociated with a municipality experiencing 0.21 additional episodes (amounting to
an increase of 10.5% on an average of 1.93 episodes p.m.); the more reliable model
(12) suggests that doubling the distance is associated with a 14.4% increase in the
expected incidence.
An inspection of the other coefficients shows the resilient relevance of the munic-
ipality’s distance from Naples, which is associated with a decrease in brigandage.
Population and area, which are trivially positively correlated with the number of
episodes, nonetheless appear to influence the incidence of brigandage in opposite
directions: geographically larger municipalities tend to display a higher brigandage
incidence, but – as we noted above – the latter decreases with the municipality’s
population. As anticipated, brigandage is associated with higher altitudes and a
longer distance from the nearest coast.
4.3.2 Mechanism: testing the role of social interaction
Table 4 presents the results of further analyses, clarifying the mechanisms behind our
result. In columns (1)–(4), we estimate our main specification using municipalities
within each quartile of the distribution of distances to the nearest near-Piedmontese
community. Consistent with our idea that geographical distance serves to approx-
34Tables A1-2 in the Appendix report all the estimates omitted in Table 3.
35In operating this transformation, we set distances in the interval [0, 1), which in fact includes
only the zero-distance of near-Piedmontese communities from themselves, to 0.
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imate cultural distance and that the diffusion of cultural and social norms is non-
linear (being much more intense at shorter distances), our estimates show that our
global effect is driven primarily by municipalities in the first quartile of the distribu-
tion of distance. This means that the cultural effect by which institutional rejection
becomes weaker the closer the municipality is to the nearest near-Piedmontese com-
munity is strong only within a range of approximately 45 kilometers from the latter.
Note that, given the types of social interactions one may expect to have taken place
in the Middle and Modern Ages in the areas under study (intermarriage, small-scale
trade, participation in local markets and fairs), it seems plausible that the diffusion
of near-Piedmontese cultural values from near-Piedmontese communities did not
proceed beyond the limit of a day’s walk (or donkey-ride) distance, which we may
reasonably locate within a range of 40 to 50 kilometers.
In columns (5) and (6), we further test the social interaction mechanism and check
whether the intensity of exposure to near-Piedmontese cultural values affects institu-
tional rejection. Indeed, the presence of multiple near-Piedmontese enclaves around
a municipality should increase the likelihood of cultural transmission and, in turn,
decrease brigandage incidence, if what matters for the spread of culture is the fre-
quency of contact with Piedmontese descendants. To perform this exercise, we con-
struct two different measures that capture the intensity of exposure to Piedmontese
communities for each municipality. The first measure (Share of near-Piedmontese
communities within 50 km) is the ratio between the average inverse distance from
near-Piedmontese communities and the average inverse distance from all municipali-
ties within a 50-kilometer radius neighborhood of the reference municipality36. This
variable, in addition to capturing the basic idea that cultural exposure increases
in the frequency of near-Piedmontese communities located within a suitably large
neighborhood, incorporates the concept that the closer the near-Piedmontese en-
claves are, the greater the chance of social interaction and, therefore, the stronger
the cultural exposure. The second variable (Share of near-Piedmontese population
within 50 km), weights inverse distances by the population of each municipality37.
The idea is again that the likelihood of admixture with Piedmontese culture is higher
the greater the number of Piedmontese descendants with which one might enter into
36Let i be the reference municipality; Ni be the set of municipalities that are closer than 50 kilo-
meters to i; dj,i the distance between municipalities j and i; and NP the set of near-Piedmontese
communities. Then,
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contact. In columns (5) and (6), we restrict our sample to the municipalities that
have at least one near-Piedmontese enclave within a radius of 50 km and include the
two variables described above. Consistent with our interpretation, the coefficients
are both negative and significant, suggesting that higher exposure to Piedmontese
culture induces a lower degree of institutional rejection.
4.3.3 Further results
This section provides additional evidence by using versions of the dependent variable
that we deem particularly significant. Columns (1) - (4) of Table 5 confirm that our
result is to be associated with brigand activities that were deeply linked with the
reaction against the institutional transplant. As we explained before, brigandage had
the most reactionary and insurrectional features in the early phases of its existence,
before transforming into a less politically motivated, albeit widespread, criminal
movement. Here, we repeat our estimation using only episodes from the years 1860
to 1864. In column (1) we run the baseline specification, in column (2) we restrict
our sample to the first quartile of the distribution of distances to the nearest near-
Piedmontese community. Columns (3) and (4) exploit the same measures of intensity
of exposure to near-Piedmontese cultural values used in Section 4.3.2. As one can
see, the estimates of our coefficients retain all their statistical significance and are
stable in size. We consider this a clear indication that cultural distance and the
intensity of the exposure to Piedmontese culture affected the strength of brigandage
in the period in which brigandage was motivated primarily by institutional rejection.
In columns (5) - (8), we use information on the types of crime for which the brigands
were convicted. Although it is informative to consider the whole set of brigandage
episodes together, it is essential to test our main hypothesis on the subset of events
with high political connotation. In particular, we restrict our analysis to episodes
that either are reported as having explicit political content (e.g., the organization of
popular insurrections or clashes with regular police or army forces) or episodes that
are classified as violent in nature (approximately 36% of all brigandage episodes).
The estimated coefficients are always similar in magnitude and significance to those
found in our previous results, and they are comparable to the one obtained using
the episodes from the years 1860 to 1864.
4.3.4 Robustness checks
This section presents a series of checks to verify the robustness of the baseline esti-
mates, to assess the stability of our results and to clarify our interpretation of the
estimates. First, we use alternative proxies for the dependent variable and the main
independent variable. Then, we test our model specification both in terms of model
and controls. The estimates of the main coefficient of interest in these alternative
specifications are reported in Table 6.
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The first five specifications, the estimates of which we present in panel (a) of Table
6, refer to variations in the dependent variable, i.e., the intensity of brigandage.
As we explained in our description of the data, observed brigandage episodes were
recorded by several sources. Typically, police and other public safety forces would
record episodes as soon as they were reported to them by officers or citizens. We
deem these sources more reliable both in terms of geographical localization and in
terms of temporal positioning. We therefore estimate our main specification (model
(8) of Table 3) using brigandage data from a single source at a time. This exer-
cise also allows us to dispel any doubt about the existence of multiple entries for
the same episode across different sources. Row (1) uses episodes recorded by police
forces only. The result is consistent with the baseline estimates, and the coefficient of
interest is only slightly smaller in magnitude. A positive but not significant effect is,
nevertheless, present even if the less reliable data from courts are used (row 2). The
strongest effect is that obtained using data from other sources, which include eccle-
siastical authorities, the Italian Ministry of Justice and other miscellaneous sources,
including the military (row 3). In rows (4) and (5), we repeat our analysis using
versions of the dependent variable that we deem particularly significant. In row (4),
we recode our dependent variable aggregating all the entries that share the same
date and the same place and are reported consecutively (within the same source), as
these distinct reports might be originally generated by the same event38. The new
definition of brigandage episodes reduces the number of episodes per municipality
and addresses the potential concern of over-reporting. The coefficient is similar in
magnitude and significance to that found in our previous results.
In panel (b) of Table 6, we propose four alternative measures of municipal proxim-
ity. In model (5), we use linear distance without taking the logarithm. As explained
above, the use of the log-transformed version of this distance was a priori motivated
by the fact that cultural similarity decreases more than linearly once one moves far-
ther away from the center of cultural diffusion and by our desire to use geographical
distance as a proxy for cultural distance. For the sake of robustness, we show that
our result holds even when the simpler kilometric distance is used. Moreover, as
culture spreads through suitable means of communication, we found it appropriate
to check whether our result held when computing road distances rather than linear
distances (row 6). This might be particularly relevant given the complex orographic
features of the areas we study. Given historical evidence on the high degree of coin-
cidence between nineteenth-century roads and the ancient network of Roman roads,
we chose to use the latter (McCormick et al., 2013) to compute our approximate
road distances. Indeed, the ancient Roman road network was the main communi-
cation system throughout the Middle and Modern Ages, i.e., the centuries in which
cultural traits from the near-Piedmontese communities might have spread, through
38It could be the case that different convictions following a single guerrilla event are reported in
multiple entries.
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socio-economic contact, to the neighboring communities (see Figure 6). Although
other minor roads not included in our network are likely to have been in use in these
centuries, there is evidence that, well into the nineteenth century, many of the road-
ways in use in Southern Italy still exploited the ancient Roman tracks. Moreover,
using the Roman road network guarantees the exogeneity of our distance measure.
The effect that we obtain is similar to that derived using linear distances. Finally,
rows (7) and (8) show the impact of near-Piedmontese communities themselves on
our result. In row (8), we use as our main dependent variable the most discrete mea-
sure of distance, namely the indicator for near-Piedmontese communities. As one
might expect, being an near-Piedmontese community has a strong negative effect on
brigandage incidence. Nevertheless, our effect is not only driven by the centers of
highest cultural proximity with the donor: in row (9), we use our main specification
while dropping near-Piedmontese communities from our sample. While the absence
of the units for which the effect is strongest reduces the magnitude of our coeffi-
cient, we nevertheless observe a sizable effect. This again confirms that cultural
and social norms indeed spread from near-Piedmontese enclaves to Southern Italy
municipalities and that the degree of cultural similarity may then have determined,
ceteris paribus, the intensity of institutional rejection in the form of brigandage.
This evidence thus also justifies ex post our choice of using a continuous rather than
discrete measure of proximity.
Rows (9), (10) and (11) present model alternatives to the Negative Binomial re-
gression of model (8) in Table 3. As Poisson regression is likely the most widely
used count model, we repeated our analysis by estimating a Poisson model for our
brigandage episodes. Moreover, we used the zero-inflated versions of both Poisson
and Negative Binomial regressions to account for the large number of zeros in our
dependent variable (just over one-third of Southern Italy municipalities experienced
no brigandage). The following specifications refine our baseline model by adding fur-
ther controls or by imposing less-stringent assumptions. Rows (12) and (13) show
that our result holds when replacing provincial indicators with more disaggregated
indicators (at the district level) or more aggregate indicators (at the regional level)39.
In row (14), we add our province-level controls, while retaining region indicators.
Similarly, line (15) adds soil quality indicators, and line (16) adds our attitude in-
dex derived from Corona (1995). These variables may be of help in assessing the
validity of our interpretation. One may in fact suppose that reaction was weaker
around near-Piedmontese areas not because of cultural factors, as we claim, but
because these communities had characteristics that made them less sensitive to the
39Both in the pre-unification kingdom and in post-unification Italy, the 16 provinces of Southern
Italy were the main administrative units. The main local government units were the municipali-
ties, which constitute our reference population. The 57 districts were intermediate administrative
subdivisions determined by the domains of jurisdiction of ordinary courts. Unlike the present
arrangement, regions were purely geographic groupings of provinces with no administrative func-
tions.
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reform imposed by the Piedmontese, such as the sensible reduction in common-use
lands. We do not have a complete mapping of Southern Italy municipalities in terms
of land use and property. Nevertheless, rows (15) and (16) show that our results
are insensitive to the addition of municipal-level controls referring to crop types,
agricultural yields and, in particular, to a measure of past propensity to accept or
oppose similar reforms. In row (17) we implement the linear model of column (9)
in Table 3 taking into account spatial correlation40. Finally, to allow for potential
correlation in the error term, we consider clustered standard errors at the district or
at the province level (rows 18-19). The findings show that our result is significant
and robust across the different specifications.
Finally, in panel d), we show that our evidence is not driven by influential observa-
tions. First, we trim (row 21) and winsorize (row 22) the extreme 1% of observations
of our dependent variable. Furthermore, in rows (22)-(24), we consider alternative
subsamples. In row (22), we exclude cities with more than 10000 inhabitants and
province seats. We then exclude all the municipalities close 41 to Naples and the
Papal States’ border to rule out the possibility that our results are driven by the
areas that received support by the former king and the church. These different
specifications show that the distance from near-Piedmontese community is always
statistically significant, negative and remarkably stable.
4.3.5 Placebo tests
The results presented thus far provide evidence that geographical proximity to a
near-Piedmontese community was ceteris paribus associated with a lower intensity
of brigandage. The robustness of this result to changes in the model’s specifica-
tion and the addition of several geographical and socio-economic controls suggests
that this was not due to some specific peculiarity of near-Piedmontese communities,
such as particular geographic characteristic or exceptional economic performance.
As formal institutions were homogeneous across Southern Italy and given the ab-
sence of historical accounts of informal institutions distinguishing near-Piedmontese
communities from neighboring settlements, the attribution of our result to cultural
differences between near-Piedmontese and local communities appears sound. This,
however, is insufficient to conclude that the driving cultural feature lay in the cul-
tural proximity of these near-Piedmontese communities with respect to the donor
environment. In a recent paper, for instance, Bracco et al. (2015) show that Al-
banian linguistic enclaves in Southern Italy display larger degrees of civicness than
the average Southern Italy municipality. This finding is attributed to the more in-
tense social cohesion that emerges within ethno-linguistic enclaves, within which
bonds and relationships are formed because of an enclave’s cultural dissimilarity
40In particular, we rely on the function used by Hsiang (2010).
41We consider all the municipalities in the top 5% of the distribution of distances to Naples and
the Papal States.
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with respect to the surrounding environment. One might then suspect that a sim-
ilar mechanism underlies our results, i.e., that near-Piedmontese communities had
developed internal social structures that, possibly through the channel of social co-
hesion, led them to display a lower propensity to violently reject the institutional
transplant than their non near-Piedmontese neighbors. To assess the plausibility of
this channel, we repeat our analysis using non-near-Piedmontese linguistic enclaves
as reference points, instead of near-Piedmontese communities. At present, as well as
in the past, Southern Italy hosts 79 non near-Piedmontese ethno-linguistic enclaves,
the majority of which (54) are of Albanian descent, the remaining 25 being of Greek
(23) or Croatian (2) origin. Column (1) of Table 7 reports the result of the estima-
tion of our main specification when the distance to the nearest non-near-Piedmontese
ethno-linguistic enclave is used as the main independent variable. In column (2),
we restrict the dependent variable only to those municipalities in the first quartile
of the distribution of distance to the nearest non-near-Piedmontese community. We
demonstrated in Section 4.3.2 that our result is highly significant within a very short
range (45 km) when using distance from near-Piedmontese enclaves; hence, we test
whether this mechanism is significant also in this alternative set of enclaves. Since
Greek communities have a very particular geographic location (see Figure 2) and
are considerably distant from the areas where the near-Piedmontese communities
lie, and also taking into account the result on communities of Albanian descent by
Bracco et al. (2015), we repeat the analyses considering Albanian (columns 3-4) and
Greek linguistic communities (columns 5-6) separately. All these specifications yield
non-significant estimates for the coefficient of interest. Thus, our attenuation effect
of the proximity to an ethno-linguistic enclave on the intensity of brigandage only
appears when the enclaves with respect to which such proximity is evaluated are
the near-Piedmontese communities. This excludes the possibility that the channel
of social cohesion due to the status of being an ethno-linguistic enclave drives our
results.
5 Brigandage and political participation
In this section, we turn to examine the impact of the institutional rejection on
political participation in the aftermath of Italian unification. The imposition of the
new institutions, the following unrest in response to the political regime change and
the subsequent hard-handed repression by the national army are natural vehicles
for the creation of a culture of mistrust and the reinforcement of negative attitudes
toward the new political structure. Such an environment can lead to a decrease in
cooperation among individuals and a reduction of the trust in national institutions,
resulting in lower political participation. Indeed, as shown by Tabellini (2010), a
poor social and political climate can induce worse cultural traits, which may in turn
lead to socio-economic backwardness. Reminiscent of Banfield (1958) and Putnam
(1993), we investigate whether there is a link between the persistent differences
25
in civic capital across Italian territories and the different degrees of institutional
rejection, quantified by the intensity of brigandage. In this respect, we follow the
existing literature and proxy political participation by electoral turnout, the only
available measure available since 1861 at the local level. We expect lower political
participation in the areas characterized by a higher incidence of brigandage.
5.1 Medium-term impact
A potential concern with this analysis is that lack of trust in the transplanted insti-
tutions may have caused brigandage in the first place, and thus, the lower turnout in
areas characterized by more intense brigand activity may simply reflect their propen-
sity to reject the transplanted institutions, in one way (violent guerrilla conflict) or
another (non-participation in elections). It is also possible that direct differential
exposure to the military invasion generated the distrust in the new regime, caus-
ing both lower levels of political participation and a higher intensity of unrest. To
address these and other related concerns, before analyzing the long-run relation-
ship between brigandage and political participation, we show that episodes from the
“grande brigantaggio” (i.e., the major wave of essentially still politically motivated
brigandage, taking place between 1862-1865) are associated with a reduction in elec-
toral turnout immediately following Italian unification. Our strategy is to compare
the first Italian national electoral round, of January 1861 (two months before formal
unification), and the first post-unification electoral round, held in October 1865. As
documented by our previous analyses, the patterns of local variations in brigandage
were already clear in the early phases (1860-1861) of the reactionary movement. We
thus assume, in this context, that turnout in the 1861 electoral round already incor-
porates the effect of local variations in the propensity for institutional rejection and
the reaction to military invasion. By taking into account the relationship between
differences in turnout between 1861 and 1865 and brigandage episodes occurring
between 1862 and 1865, we are thus able to isolate the direct relationship between
the latter and political participation, in addition to the underlying local differences
in civic capital and trust in the new institutions.
To this end, we exploit an additional data source: the Atlante Storico Elettorale
d’Italia, a dataset collected by the Istituto Carlo Cattaneo containing detailed in-
formation on Italian national elections since 1861. During the period we analyze,
municipalities were grouped into roughly equally sized (in terms of voters) con-
stituencies; each constituency elected one member of Parliament. Electoral data on
turnout of elections in the period 1861-1919 are available at the constituency level.
All municipalities in which there was at least one eligible voter were reported. We
use historical sources to identify the formal constituency to which each municipal-
ity belonged to have a precise assessment of the number of brigandage episodes by
constituency. One also needs to consider that our outcome variable only reflects the
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political participation of the élites, who were less involved than popular masses in
the rebellion against the Piedmontese42.
We estimate the following linear model:




3Hi + γj + εi (2)
where ∆Ti,j is the difference in turnout between 1865 and 1861 in constituency i
and province j; Yi is the total number of episodes (per thousand inhabitants) that
occurred between 1862 and 1865 in constituency i; Xi and Hi are vectors of ge-
ographical and constituency controls, respectively, the former being measured for
the main municipality of the constituency, while the latter are aggregated from mu-
nicipal controls (see Section 3); γj is a province indicator
43; and, finally, εi is an
error term satisfying the usual assumptions. We expect the estimate of β1 to be
significantly different from zero; specifically, we conjecture that a higher incidence
of brigandage should be negatively related to changes in turnout.
The estimated coefficients are reported in Table 7. In columns (1)-(3), we regress
the change in turnout on the brigandage episodes reported in the period between
the two elections (1862-1865). In column (1), we control for province fixed effects,
while in column (2), we add the geographical controls. Finally, in column (3), we
implement the baseline specification (2). According to our estimates, one additional
episode per thousand inhabitants is associated with a decrease of 2.8% in turnout
between the two elections. This is a sizable effect if we consider that the average
change in turnout (in absolute value) at the constituency level was 11% , supporting
the assumption that brigandage had a significant effect on electoral participation.
In columns (4) and (5), we use the total number of episodes of brigandage (per thou-
sand inhabitants) in the period 1860-1870 and the episodes of brigandage reported
in 1860-1861, respectively. The estimated coefficients are not statistically signifi-
cant, which suggests that the change in turnout observed between the two elections
may be related to the episodes of brigandage reported in the inter-electoral period
rather than to other features generically associated with brigandage incidence.
42Indeed, according to the 1859 electoral law, eligible voters had to meet some requirements
in terms of age (older than 25), minimum literacy and income (at least 40 lire per year). The
combination of these criteria reduced the number of potential voters in the country to 400,000,
corresponding to approximately 2% of total population.
43Province fixed effects are particularly relevant in our specification since they capture the cor-
relation between the Pica law (implemented at the provincial level) and electoral turnout, as
underlined by Accetturo et al. (2016).
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5.2 Long-term impact
In the context of state formation, it would be interesting to know whether the impact
of brigandage vanished with the end of the violent unrests or outlived them. Un-
fortunately, changes in electoral rules do not allow a meaningful direct comparison
of turnout between the 1861 and later elections. In what follows, we provide sug-
gestive evidence that the negative relationship between the intensity of brigandage
and electoral turnout does not disappear before the turn of the twentieth century.
Here, we estimate a set of linear models, one for each electoral round in the period
1892-191344:
Ti,j = α + β1Yi + β
′
2Xi + γj + εi (3)
where Ti,j is turnout in constituency i and province j; Yi is the total number of
episodes (per thousand inhabitants) in the municipality where constituency i is es-
tablished, designated simply as municipality i45; Xi is a vector of geographical and
historical controls measured for municipality i; and γj and εi are as in model (2).
Table 9 reports estimates of β1 when all episodes of brigandage are used as the main
independent variable. We use the same set of controls as in the regression imple-
mented in Section 4.3.146. Columns (1)-(7) report the results: overall, the estimated
coefficients remain highly robust across the various specifications, the estimated co-
efficient is always negative, fairly stable and, up to 1904, statistically significant. Our
findings suggest that brigandage-intensive areas display significantly lower turnout
until the turn of the twentieth century. These results indicate that immediate insti-
tutional rejection has a long-lasting impact – up to half a century after its occurrence
– on political participation, as it undermines trust in the institutions of the newborn
state.
44We restrict our attention to the period 1882-1913 because it provides us with homogeneous
electoral rules and a substantial expansion of the electorate in comparison to previous elections (and
thus with higher validity for our estimates): since the requirements on age, literacy and income
were weakened, the new electoral rule more than doubled the number of people with the right to
vote. Furthermore, we do not include contemporary controls (referring to the years in which we
measure turnout), as they could themselves be outcomes of the unification process. We do not
consider the three electoral rounds in 1882, 1886 and 1890 because we have very few constituencies
(fewer than 40) due to the electoral reform.
45For these electoral rounds, it is not possible to map municipalities into constituencies, and thus,
we restrict our analysis to the main municipality of each constituency, which usually corresponds
with the most populated settlement.
46With respect to the main specification, we do not control for the distance to the closest near-




This work analyzes the outcomes following the institutional transplantation that
took place in 1860-1865, in the context of the Italian unification process. The im-
position of the Piedmontese administrative and legal framework on Southern Italy
sparked an armed reaction by the peasant classes in continental Southern Italy,
which is known as brigandage. We use historical sources and construct a dataset
that allows us to evaluate the intensity of this phenomenon at the municipal level.
Next, we relate this measure to the distance of each municipality from the near-
est of ten communities descending from near-Piedmontese settlers. Across several
model specifications and using a variety of controls, we find robust evidence that
distance from the nearest near-Piedmontese community (which we use as a proxy
for cultural distance) is ceteris paribus associated with a lower intensity and inci-
dence of brigandage. We interpret this result as evidence in favor of the hypothesis
that, in the context of an institutional transplantation, cultural proximity with the
donor environment reduces the propensity of the recipient environment for institu-
tional rejection in the short term. Short-run rejection may have a direct impact
on important social outcomes: here, we document a significant decline in electoral
turnout in the aftermath of unification in places where more brigandage episodes
were reported. Further suggestive evidence outlines a negative relationship between
the intensity of institutional rejection and turnout that does not disappear until
the turn of the twentieth century. These results are able to shed some light on the
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Figure 2: Municipalities in continental Southern Italy as of 1861 (dots), with near-
Piedmontese communities (red pinpoints) and other linguistic enclaves (blue and
green pinpoints).
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Figure 3: Excerpts from the State Archives used to construct our measure of brigandage intensity (i.e. the dependent variable of the
dataset).
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Figure 4: Intensity of brigandage (in episodes per 1,000 inhabitants) in Southern
Italy municipalities. Near-Piedmontese communities are denoted by the red dots.
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Source: US National Park Service
Figure 6: The Ancient Roman road network from McCormick et al. (2013) used to
compute road distances. Municipalities which do not lie on any roads are projected
onto the nearest point belonging to the network. Near-Piedmontese communities
are denoted by the red pinpoints.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics and means comparison
(1) (2) (3)
nP communities Other municip. Difference
Area 1861 (ha) 4361.30 4163.67 -197.63
Pop. 1861 (ths.) 3.01 3.66 0.65
Pop. growth 1824-61 -0.11 -0.04 0.06
Altitude (100m) 6.71 4.14 -2.58***
Raggedness (100m) 10.13 7.24 -2.89*
Ozak index 8.35 8.28 -0.07***
Dist. Naples 138.98 160.19 21.20*
Dist. n. prov. seat. 33.64 32.13 -1.51
Dist. town 30.59 19.01 -11.58
Dist. coast 35.17 22.11 -13.06
Dist. Papal States 218.56 191.57 -26.99
Dist. Piedm. isl. 0.00 89.25 89.25***
Roads Piedm. 0.00 116.35 116.35***
Observations 10 1845 1855
All distances are expressed in kilometers. Tests for the difference in means allow for
unequal variances in the sub-samples (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics by brigandage intensity
(1) (2) (3)
Occasional brig. Frequent brig. Highly freq. brig.
Area 1861 (ha) 3752.844 4577.075 5054.140
Pop. 1861 (ths.) 3.723 3.595 3.481
Pop. growth 1824-61 -0.059 -0.031 0.000
Altitude (100m) 3.768 4.530 5.095
Raggedness (100m) 6.768 7.749 8.566
Ozak index 8.256 8.305 8.325
Dist. Naples 192.026 128.084 115.596
Dist. n. prov. seat. 31.437 32.845 35.287
Dist. town 18.043 20.109 22.103
Dist. coast 19.220 25.144 28.029
Dist. Papal States 227.312 156.074 144.298
Dist. Piedm. isl. 98.919 78.610 69.879
Roads Piedm. 128.291 103.147 92.547
Observations 928 927 463
All distances are expressed in kilometers.
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Table 3: Baseline Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dep. Var. Epi. tot. Epi. tot. Epi. tot. Epi. tot. Epi. tot. Epi. tot. Ep. p.m. Ep. p.m. Ep. p.m. Epi. tot. Epi. tot. Epi. tot.
(log) Dist. Pie.. 1.420** 1.718** 1.460** 0.115* 0.151** 0.140** 0.599*** 0.677*** 0.671*** 0.146** 0.189*** 0.194***
(0.716) (0.773) (0.723) (0.0611) (0.0613) (0.0611) (0.166) (0.168) (0.169) (0.0623) (0.0625) (0.0624)
Population Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Restr. Restr. Restr.
Geo. Cont. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dist. Cont. No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Mun. cont. No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Model OLS OLS OLS Neg.Bin. Neg.Bin. Neg.Bin. OLS OLS OLS Neg.Bin. Neg.Bin. Neg.Bin.
(A-P)/R2 0.409 0.424 0.490 0.156 0.160 0.166 0.357 0.361 0.360 0.114 0.117 0.122
Obs. 1855 1855 1855 1855 1855 1855 1855 1855 1855 1855 1855 1855
Province FEs and Pop.growth 1824-61 are included in all specifications. Geographical controls include: (log) Area 1861 (ha), (log) Pop. 1861 (ths.), Altitude
(100ms), Raggedness (100ms), Longitude and Latitude. Distance controls include: (log) Dist. Naples, (log) Dist. prov. seat, (log) Dist. town, (log) Dist.
coast, (log) Dist. Papal States. Municipal controls include dummy variables for the presence in each municipality of: civil, criminal or commercial courts;
of the local episcopal or archiepiscopal seat; of secondary education institutes; of hospitals; and of relevant manufactures or proto-industrial plants. Robust
standard errors in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
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Table 4: Mechanisms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var. Ep. p.m. Ep. p.m. Ep. p.m. Ep. p.m. Ep. p.m. Ep. p.m.
(log) Dist. Piedm. 0.397*** 0.256 -0.571 0.699
(0.0651) (0.490) (0.719) (1.369)
Share of nP enclaves in 50Km -11.78***
(2.778)
Share of nP pop in 50Km -10.79***
(3.726)
Quartile 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
Indicator N. of nP Exposed pop.
Obs. 464 464 464 463 516 516
Geographical, Municipal controls, Pop.growth 1824-61 and Province FEs are included in all specifications. Province FEs
are included in all specifications. Geographical controls include: (log) Area 1861 (ha), (log) Pop. 1861 (ths.), Altitude
(100ms), Raggedness (100ms), Longitude, Latitude, (log) Dist. Naples, (log) Dist. prov. seat, (log) Dist. town, (log)
Dist. coast, (log) Dist. Papal States.Municipal controls include dummy variables for the presence in each municipality
of: civil, criminal or commercial courts; of the local episcopal or archiepiscopal seat; of secondary education institutes;
of hospitals; and of relevant manufactures or proto-industrial plants. Robust standard errors in parentheses (* p<0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
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Table 5: Further Results
Episodes 1860-1864 Political and Violent Episodes
All munic. 1st quartile 50km from nP 50km from nP All munic. 1st quartile 50km from nP 50km from nP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(log) Dist. Piedm. 0.191*** 0.442*** 0.179*** 0.416***
(0.0724) (0.0814) (0.0621) (0.0711)
share of nP in 50km -15.03*** -9.969***
(3.470) (2.992)
share of nP pop. in 50km -13.26*** -9.934**
(4.487) (4.122)
Observations 1,855 464 516 516 1,855 464 516 516
Pseudo R2 0.119 0.164 0.159 0.157 0.130 0.161 0.156 0.155
Geographical, Municipal controls, Pop.growth 1824-61 and Province FEs are included in all specifications. Province FEs are included in all specifications.
Geographical controls include: (log) Area 1861 (ha), (log) Pop. 1861 (ths.), Altitude (100ms), Raggedness (100ms), Longitude, Latitude, (log) Dist. Naples,
(log) Dist. prov. seat, (log) Dist. town, (log) Dist. coast, (log) Dist. Papal States. Municipal controls include dummy variables for the presence in each
municipality of: civil, criminal or commercial courts; of the local episcopal or archiepiscopal seat; of secondary education institutes; of hospitals; and of relevant
manufactures or proto-industrial plants. Robust standard errors in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
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Table 6: Robustness Checks
β1 s.e. Obs.
a) Dependent Variable
1) Source: Police 0.188** (0.0758) 1,855
2) Source: Courts 0.140 (0.0877) 1,855
3) Source: Others 0.409** (0.185) 1,855
4) Different Aggregation 0.190*** (0.0585) 1,855
b) Proximity Variable
5) Distances in kilometers 0.00451** (0.0019) 1,855
6) Roman roads 0.228*** (0.0527) 1,855
7) Near-Piedmontese dummy -0.946*** (0.250) 1,855
8) Excluding near-Piedmontese 0.144* (0.0801) 1,845
c) Specification
9) Poisson 0.229*** (0.0517) 1,855
10) Zero-inflated Poisson 0.225*** (0.0520) 1,855
11) Zero-inflated Negative Binomial 0.188*** (0.0621) 1,855
12) District FEs (57) 0.168** (0.0730) 1,855
13) Region FEs (5) 0.129** (0.0562) 1,855
14) Region FEs + Province-level controls 0.269*** (0.0584) 1,855
15) Soil quality 0.179*** (0.0628) 1,826
16) Attitudes 0.193*** (0.0623) 1,855
17) Spatial Correlation 0.671*** (0.1674) 1,855
18) Clustering at District level 0.194** (0.0919) 1,855
19) Clustering at Province level 0.194** (0.0821) 1,855
d) Alternative Samples
20) Trimming 0.187*** (0.0624) 1,855
21) Winsorizing 0.191*** (0.0619) 1,855
22) No big cities 0.206*** (0.0633) 1,855
23) No neighborhood Naples 0.172*** (0.0621) 1,855
24) No neighborhood Papal States 0.165** (0.0655) 1,855
Geographical, Municipal controls, as described in Table 4, and Pop.growth 1824-61 are
included in all specifications.The reported coefficient is the one on the log distance from
the closest near-Piedmontese community unless differently specified. Robust standard
errors in parentheses unless differently specified. (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
46
Table 7: Placebo Regressions
Non nP enclaves Arbereshe enclaves Greek enclaves
All episodes 1st quartile All episodes 1st quartile All episodes 1st quartile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(log) Dist. non-Piedm. 0.0261 0.0688
(0.0435) (0.0695)
(log) Dist. Arbereshe 0.0669 0.0613
(0.0456) (0.0659)
(log) Dist. Greek 0.0276 0.0203
(0.100) (0.119)
R2 0.121 0.169 0.121 0.184 0.121 0.110
Obs. 1855 464 1855 464 1855 464
Geographical, Municipal controls, Pop.growth 1824-61 and Province FEs are included in all specifications. Province FEs are
included in all specifications. Geographical controls include: (log) Area 1861 (ha), (log) Pop. 1861 (ths.), Altitude (100ms),
Raggedness (100ms), Longitude, Latitude, (log) Dist. Naples, (log) Dist. prov. seat, (log) Dist. town, (log) Dist. coast, (log)
Dist. Papal States. Municipal controls include dummy variables for the presence in each municipality of: civil, criminal or
commercial courts; of the local episcopal or archiepiscopal seat; of secondary education institutes; of hospitals; and of relevant
manufactures or proto-industrial plants. Robust standard errors in parentheses (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
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Table 8: Electoral Turnout 1861-1865
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. Var. ∆ Turnout ∆ Turnout ∆ Turnout ∆ Turnout ∆ Turnout
Ep. p.m. 1862-1865 -0.022* -0.026* -0.027*
(0.011) (0.015) (0.013)
All Ep. p.m. -0.021
(0.013)
Ep. p.m. 1860-1861 -0.021
(0.047)
Geographical Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constituency Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.185 0.229 0.301 0.301 0.289
Obs. 124 124 124 124 124
Geographical controls include: (log) Area 1861 (ha), (log) Pop. 1861 (ths.), Altitude (100ms), Raggedness
(100ms), (log) Dist. Naples, (log) Dist. prov. seat, (log) Dist. coast, (log) Dist. Papal States and a dummy
for near-Piedmontese communities in the constituency. Constituency controls include dummy variables for the
presence in each constituency of: civil, criminal or commercial courts; of the local episcopal or archiepiscopal
seat; of secondary education institutes; of hospitals; and of relevant manufactures or proto-industrial plants.
Province FEs are included in all specifications. Robust standard errors are clustered at province level. (*
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
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Table 9: Electoral Turnout 1892-1913: Long Term Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1892 1895 1897 1900 1904 1909 1913
All Episodes p.m. -0.005* -0.006* -0.002 -0.007** -0.004** 0.003 0.001
0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.004
Geographical Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.528 0.462 0.455 0.441 0.481 0.509 0.606
Obs. 125 125 125 126 126 126 126
Geographical controls include: (log) Area 1861 (ha), (log) Pop. 1861 (ths.), Altitude (100ms),
Raggedness (100ms), (log) Dist. Naples, (log) Dist. prov. seat, (log) Dist. coast, (log) Dist. Papal
States. Municipal controls as in Table 4. Province FEs, (log) Pop.1861, Pop.growth 1824-61 and
dummy variables for the winning party are included in all specifications. Robust standard errors
are clustered at province level. (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01).
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Appendix A
Figure A1: Examples of linguistic similarities between Lucanian, the Gallo-Italic
dialect of Tito, Western Ligurian and Southern Piedmontese. Source: Rohlfs (1988)
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Figure A2: Maps of the Gallo-Romance clusters in Basilicata. Source: Rohlfs (1972)
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Figure A3: Examples of linguistic similarities between Guardia Piemontese and Val
d’Angrogna (Piedmont). Source: Vegezzi Ruscalla (1862)
Figure A4: List of surnames attributed to the Piedmontese migration in Basilicata.
Source:Rohlfs (1985)
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Table A1: Table 3 reporting all coefficients
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var. Epi. tot. Epi. tot. Epi. tot. Epi. tot. Epi. tot. Epi. tot.
(log) Dist. Piedm. 1.420** 1.718** 1.460** 0.115* 0.151** 0.140**
(0.716) (0.773) (0.723) (0.0611) (0.0613) (0.0611)
(log) Pop. 1861 5.964*** 5.126*** 3.272*** 0.804*** 0.735*** 0.663***
(0.718) (0.661) (0.475) (0.0581) (0.0603) (0.0584)
Pop. growth 1824-61 1.626*** 1.527*** 0.430 0.0360*** 0.0307*** -0.0145
(0.183) (0.167) (0.466) (0.00871) (0.00843) (0.0183)
Latitude -0.773 -1.088 -0.163 -0.426*** -0.471*** -0.399***
(1.587) (1.603) (1.602) (0.161) (0.163) (0.151)
Longitude -0.760 0.389 0.384 -0.00940 0.247* 0.269**
(0.869) (1.015) (0.933) (0.110) (0.136) (0.136)
(log) Area 1861 2.324*** 3.068*** 2.265*** 0.397*** 0.468*** 0.439***
(0.342) (0.370) (0.321) (0.0496) (0.0529) (0.0529)
Altitude (100m) 0.507*** 0.421*** 0.364** 0.0644*** 0.0548*** 0.0530***
(0.134) (0.162) (0.154) (0.0156) (0.0180) (0.0181)
Raggedness (100m) 0.103* 0.108* 0.175*** 0.0380*** 0.0394*** 0.0431***
(0.0593) (0.0595) (0.0574) (0.00751) (0.00749) (0.00711)
(log) Dist. Naples -1.349 -1.941** -0.325*** -0.438***
(1.238) (0.758) (0.121) (0.111)
(log) Dist. seat -0.978* 0.232 -0.00341 0.101**
(0.554) (0.412) (0.0513) (0.0480)
(log) Dist. town -1.054* -0.529 -0.0647 -0.0319
(0.587) (0.552) (0.0428) (0.0405)
(log) Dist. coast 0.945*** 1.150*** 0.122*** 0.141***
(0.297) (0.261) (0.0369) (0.0350)
(log) Dist. Papal States -0.330 -0.00467 -0.146* -0.136*





Civil court -4.544 0.0381
(11.94) (0.473)
Criminal court 31.43*** 1.374***
(11.93) (0.403)












Geographical Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Dist. Cont. No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Mun. cont. No No Yes No No Yes
Emp. Model OLS OLS OLS Neg.Bin. Neg.Bin. Neg.Bin.
(A-P)/R2 0.409 0.424 0.490 0.156 0.160 0.166
Obs. 1855 1855 1855 1855 1855 1855
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Table A2: Table 3 reporting all coefficients
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dep. Var. Ep. p.m. Ep. p.m. Ep. p.m. Epi. tot. Epi. tot. Epi. tot.
(log) Dist. Piedm. 0.599*** 0.677*** 0.671*** 0.146** 0.189*** 0.194***
(0.166) (0.168) (0.169) (0.0623) (0.0625) (0.0624)
Pop. growth 1824-61 0.0244 0.0281 -0.0266 0.0205*** 0.0167** -0.0363*
(0.0470) (0.0464) (0.0681) (0.00747) (0.00780) (0.0192)
Latitude -0.651 -0.627 -0.636 -0.436*** -0.459*** -0.406**
(0.424) (0.430) (0.433) (0.166) (0.169) (0.162)
Longitude -0.105 -0.0341 -0.0225 0.0292 0.249* 0.267*
(0.242) (0.232) (0.234) (0.114) (0.141) (0.141)
(log) Area 1861 0.405*** 0.452*** 0.413*** 0.289*** 0.328*** 0.291***
(0.0717) (0.0751) (0.0800) (0.0397) (0.0423) (0.0449)
Altitude (100m) 0.178*** 0.136*** 0.136*** 0.0782*** 0.0642*** 0.0635***
(0.0403) (0.0476) (0.0479) (0.0152) (0.0184) (0.0185)
Raggedness (100m) 0.0804*** 0.0807*** 0.0821*** 0.0420*** 0.0426*** 0.0455***
(0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0158) (0.00775) (0.00777) (0.00747)
(log) Dist. Naples -0.508*** -0.543*** -0.322*** -0.409***
(0.178) (0.176) (0.120) (0.113)
(log) Dist. seat 0.0715 0.108 -0.000459 0.0829
(0.0745) (0.0785) (0.0511) (0.0507)
(log) Dist. town 0.173** 0.199** 0.0180 0.0524
(0.0741) (0.0773) (0.0407) (0.0385)
(log) Dist. coast 0.197*** 0.209*** 0.130*** 0.146***
(0.0633) (0.0636) (0.0376) (0.0364)
(log) Dist. Papal States -0.0656 -0.0678 -0.145* -0.140*





Civil court -0.385 -0.0147
(1.038) (0.535)
Criminal court 1.468 1.442***
(1.009) (0.422)












Geographical Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dist. Cont. No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Mun. cont. No No Yes No No Yes
Emp. Model OLS OLS OLS Neg.Bin. Neg.Bin. Neg.Bin.
(A-P)/R2 0.357 0.361 0.360 0.114 0.117 0.122
Obs. 1855 1855 1855 1855 1855 1855
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